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This paper shows that additional insights on PTA formation can be gained from 
separating North-South, North-North, and South-South country pairs. Inter-industry trade 
is mostly significant for all country pairs and intra-industry trade has a positive impact 
only for North-South and North-North country pairs. Controlling for geographical 
proximity, countries choose PTA partners with which they have a history of trading. 
Using a simple model, this paper demonstrates that trade protection is not the necessary 
outcome with international product fragmentation. Empirical findings support the 




Key Words: preferential trading agreements, product fragmentation, trade policy 
JEL Classification: F13, F15 
 
                                                 
* Department of Economics, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA. 
E-mail: hparcon@hawaii.edu 1 
 
I.  Introduction 
  The number of Preferential Trading Agreements (PTAs) has dramatically increased since 
1980, when there were only 43 agreements in force.  This number has multiplied almost nine 
times in less than three decades, growing to 380 as of 2007.
1  In a single PTA, two or more 
countries can be a party to it.  If we consider all the possible pairs of countries that are currently 
in a PTA, then more than 600 country pairs are extending preferential trading arrangements to 
each other.
2  Chase (2005) mentioned that these trading arrangements raise three fundamental 
questions.  First, why do countries form trading blocs?  Second, what is the impact of trading 
blocs on the multilateral integration of the world economy?  Third, how does the creation of 
trading blocs affect economic and political cooperation between regions?  According to Chase, 
these questions are sequentially linked.  Hence, in order to understand the second and third 
questions, analytic work must start on the first one.  However, a majority of existing studies 
focus on the second and third questions.  This motivates the current study to focus on the first 
question.  In particular, this study asks “What factors help explain PTA formation among 
countries?” and “How do countries choose their PTA partners?”  These questions essentially 
recognize that trade policy is endogenous – that is, PTA formation much like any other trade 
policy is motivated by both economic and political factors.  However, existing studies on 
endogenous trade policy focus on political factors.  In particular, these studies provide 
explanation of how trade policy is determined by a certain political process.  This study departs 
from this literature by looking at the economic determinants of trade policy, in particular of PTA 
formation.   
                                                 
1 This number only includes PTAs that were notified to the WTO.  If PTAs in force, but not notified; signed, but not 
in force; currently being negotiated; and in the proposal stage are accounted for, then the total number of PTAs 
would reach 400 in 2010 (www.wto.org).  According to the World Bank (Global Economic Prospects 2005), there 
are only 12 countries (US territories included) that are not recorded as being party to a PTA.  In addition, on average 
each country is a member of five PTAs.   
2 See Appendix Table 1.   2 
 
The literature on PTA formation mentions that PTAs are different from one another 
because countries have different objectives when they negotiate them.  For instance, a South 
country may sign a PTA with a North country in an effort to be the latter’s favored low cost 
supplier.  North countries, meanwhile, may forge a PTA with each other to gain economies of 
scale in the production of differentiated goods.  Though previous theoretical studies have 
recognized the different motivations of countries, empirical studies have pooled different PTAs 
together.  Hence, important relationships may have been concealed.  Some factors influencing 
PTA formation may be common for all types of PTAs, but their relative importance may vary 
according to whether they are between North North, South South, and North South countries.  
This research shows that there is a basis for disaggregating PTAs by country pairs using the 
models developed by Krugman (1991a, 1991b), Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1998), Deardorff and 
Stern (1994), Haveman (1996), and Spilimbergo and Stein (1998).   
Next, I juxtapose the proliferation of PTAs with the recent trends in international division 
of labor.  Most PTA models assume that countries trade only in final goods.  However, it is but a 
reality that trade in intermediates is becoming more prominent in recent decades and this can be 
attributed to international product fragmentation, which has been growing at a rapid rate since 
the early 1980’s (UNCTAD, 2006).  Aggregate indicators of international product fragmentation 
have shown this to be the case.
3  Gross product associated with international production and 
foreign affiliate sales worldwide increased faster than global GDP and global exports.  As seen in 
Appendix Table 2, both increased more than six fold from 1982 to 2005.  Gross product 
associated with international production was about $600 billion in 1982, but increased to $4 
trillion by 2005.  Sales of foreign affiliates worldwide stood at about $3 trillion in 1980, but has 
                                                 
3 Three generally accepted proxy indicators for international product fragmentation are gross product associated 
with international production, global sales of foreign affiliates, and outward FDI stock (UNCTAD, 2006).   3 
 
increased to about $22 trillion in 2005.  According to UNCTAD (2000), half of the sales of 
foreign affiliates was intra firm (either among affiliates or between parents and their affiliates), 
which is a manifestation of international product fragmentation.  Outward FDI stock, albeit an 
imperfect measure of international production, has likewise increased.  Standing at $600 billion 
in 1982, it jumped to $10 trillion in 2005.  Existing studies have pointed out that firms involved 
with international production strategies prefer a free trading environment and harmonized 
international regulations.
4  Thus, countries that are substantially involved in international 
production may have more motivation to seek trading arrangements.  Given these, this study will 
investigate the possible role of international product fragmentation on PTA formation, which has 
not been considered yet in past studies.  I believe that recent developments in the patterns of 
international division of labor are a driving force in the evolution of international trade regimes.  
The relationship between PTAs and firm activity is typically analyzed with the causality running 
from the former to the latter.
5  This study recognizes the possibility that causality runs in the 
opposite direction.   
Therefore, I raise two main questions in this study.  First, what factors motivate North 
and South countries to choose countries of the same or different type for a PTA?  Second, does 
international product fragmentation influence North South PTA formation?  Answers to these 
questions are important for policy makers.  Results of the study may provide an explanation why 
PTAs proliferate in spite of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and may give insights as to 
how the rules of the WTO should adapt to reflect developments in the patterns of international 
division of labor.   
                                                 
4 See for instance Lipson (1982), Cantwell (1994), Cheng, Liu, and Yang (2000), Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001), 
Cheng and Kierzkowski (2001), Ando (2005), and Blanchard (2005).  
5 For instance, Medvedev (2006), Baldwin (2001), and Anderson and Blackhurst (1993).   4 
 
Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning the limitations of this study.  This research 
does not seek to give a full account of PTA determinants.  Instead, it provides explanations on 
the formation of PTAs and the choice of PTA partners that are grounded on economic theory.  
Political factors will be accounted for, but it will not be the focus of the discussion.   
  In addition, before proceeding some terms need to be clarified.  First, a Preferential 
Trading Agreement or PTA is defined as a union between two or more countries in which goods 
produced within the union are subject to lower trade barriers than the goods produced outside the 
union.  Second, the term PTA will be used to refer to free trade areas, custom unions, and 
common markets, which all fall within the purview of GATT Article XXIV.
6  This study does 
not make any distinction among these arrangements.  Third, the term PTA will be 
interchangeably used with trading blocs throughout the discussion.   
  This study is organized as follows:  Section II gives a review of the literature on 
theoretical studies of trading bloc formation, which provides empirical basis for separating PTAs 
into North South, North North, and South South PTAs.  Likewise, studies that link international 
product fragmentation and trade policy are presented.  Section III presents the hypotheses based 
on the studies presented in Section II.  In addition, a simple model is presented to show how 
international product fragmentation can possibly influence PTA formation.  Section IV presents 
the empirical methodology.  Section V presents the empirical results and analysis.  Section VI 





                                                 
6 Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996)   5 
 
II.  Related Literature  
  The pioneering work on custom unions of Viner (1950), where analysis of trade creation 
and trade diversion was introduced, is the basis of most theoretical studies on trading bloc 
formation.  Trade creation occurs when imports increase from a member country to replace 
domestic production that prior to the agreement, was being produced domestically at a relatively 
high cost. Trade diversion, meanwhile, arises when imports from a low cost non member country 
is reduced in favor of a relatively high cost member country.
7  The possibility of trade diversion 
is the principal objection to the formation of PTAs.  Thus, most studies argue that countries 
should choose PTA partners such that trade diversion is minimized.
8   
One important contributor on the theory of trading bloc formation is Krugman (1991a, 
1991b).  Using a monopolistic competition framework with one factor of production
9, Krugman 
(1991a) presented a trading bloc model in a world with symmetric nations and complete product 
differentiation.  With labor as the only factor of production, comparative advantage gains from 
trade are ruled out.  This means that product variety and internal economies of scale in the 
production of each variety are the sources of gains from trade.  Since each variety of the good 
will be produced in only one country, then there is no reason for countries to compete for 
markets and so countries’ products will be imperfect substitutes.  Since preferences are likewise 
symmetric, countries will tend to consume all countries’ goods equally.  With zero intra  and 
inter continental transportation costs, forming few trading blocs would have a tendency to reduce 
world welfare since countries substitute goods away from each other.  This trade diversion 
                                                 
7 Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996)   
8 Kemp and Wan (1976) argued that trading blocs are always potentially beneficial to its members.  In particular, if 
members reduce their external tariffs to the point that external trade remains at its pre trading bloc level, then 
members can ensure that there would be no trade diversion 
9 Krugman (1991a, 1991b) used the monopolistic competition framework in Krugman (1979).   6 
 
reduces the volume of trade between two countries that are in different blocs, which is reinforced 
by a rise in the tariff rate between countries in different blocs.
10   
However, Krugman (1991b) explains that when trading blocs are formed by countries 
that are natural trading partners, then the possibility of trade diversion is minimized.  Countries 
being natural trading partners may come in two forms.  In the first form, the emphasis is on 
transportation costs that are assumed low between countries within the same region or continent.  
In the second form, the emphasis is on large initial volume of trade that may result, inter alia, 
from geographical proximity.
11    In either case, countries are referred to as natural trading 
partners.  Based on the first form, Krugman (1991b) argued that when prohibitively high inter 
continental transportation costs
12 exist and intra continental transportation costs are zero, then a 
trading bloc within a continent is welfare improving even among similar countries where trade is 
based on product variety. This result holds even for non prohibitive but sufficiently high inter 
continental transportation costs as shown by Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1998).  The latter 
emphasized that trading costs includes not just transportation costs, but considerations on 
familiarity with laws and institutions; and adaptability to market conditions as well.   
  Deardorff and Stern (1994) presented a trading bloc model where countries may differ in 
either technologies or factor endowments; hence comparative advantage gains from trade are 
captured.  Unlike Krugman (1991b) and Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1998), the model is silent about 
geographical proximity.  Rather, the model emphasizes that forming a trading bloc with at least 
one country of dissimilar technology is enough to realize more than half of the gains from free 
                                                 
10 Three trading blocs will give the lowest world welfare.  However, as the number of blocs increases beyond three, 
world welfare will increase.  The reason for this is that in a world with many small blocs, no bloc would have 
significant market power, and since most of each bloc’s consumption would be imported and subject to the same 
external tariff, there would be little trade diversion (Krugman, 1991b).   
11 Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) 
12 These take Samuelson’s iceberg form; that is, of a unit of a good shipped from one continent to another, only a 
fraction 1 γ arrives.  7 
 
trade.  This result holds in a multiple country setting as long as the autarky price of a country is 
different from the trading bloc equilibrium price.  Similarly, Haveman (1996) shows that if the 
least similar countries form trading blocs, world welfare can increase.  However, Haveman 
defined similarity of countries in terms of their geographical proximity.  He argued that relative 
endowments of primary factors and stage of development are highly correlated with geographical 
proximity.  Therefore, this implies that the farther two countries are geographically, the greater is 
the welfare increase.  This line of reasoning is problematic since it assumes that transportation 
costs do not exist.  If transportation costs are substantial, then it is possible for the comparative 
advantage gains from trade to dissipate.   
  A limitation of aforementioned models is that analysis is based only on the exchange of 
final goods.  However, stylized facts show that trade in intermediate goods has grown in 
importance in the past two decades.  The trading bloc model of Spilimbergo and Stein (1998) 
reflect this phenomenon.  Spilimbergo and Stein (henceforth SS) consider trade in intermediate 
goods and trading bloc formation among countries at different levels of development (North 
South) as well as those formed among similar countries (South South and North North).  
Countries that are more capital abundant are classified as North, while those that are more labor 
abundant are classified as South.  Labor is assumed to be specific in the production of the 
agricultural good, while capital is specific in intermediates that are used to produce 
manufactures. 
  SS assigned different values to their model parameters and used simulation technique to 
determine which type of bloc will give the highest welfare to different types of countries.  For 
the case where transportation costs are zero, they showed that if tariffs are positive and equal 
across countries and when the main motivation for trade is to take advantage of product variety 
rather than cost differentials, then both North and South countries should form trading blocs with 8 
 
North countries as this will give them the highest welfare.  In addition, since North countries are 
capital abundant, then it follows that they will produce the different varieties of intermediate 
goods.  If the main motivation for trade were to take advantage of cost differentials, then any 
country would want to form a trading bloc with a country of the opposite type.  They showed 
that only for the case when inter continental transportation costs are sufficiently high would a 
South country prefer forming a trading bloc with a geographically proximate South country.   
  A limitation of the SS model is that it is a specific factors model.  Thus, one cannot really 
be certain whether the trade patterns are really due to comparative advantage.  Moreover, since 
intermediates are produced using capital only, then the capital abundant North countries would 
necessarily produce all intermediate goods.  This leaves no room for South countries to produce 
intermediate goods.  Thus, if cost differential is the main motivation to form a PTA, then North 
and South countries would only do so because of their trade in final goods, which is actually not 
well represented in reality.  Furthermore, as pointed out by Haveman (1998), the motivation of 
South countries to form trading blocs with North countries on the basis of product variety is 
highly questionable.  Haveman points out that in most cases South countries are more concerned 
with securing the source of supply for their daily needs than varying the composition of their 
expenditures.   
  The works of Ethier (1982), and Jones and Kierzkowski (1990), although not trading bloc 
models, provide for the possibility that North and South countries trade not only in final goods, 
but in intermediate goods as well.  In addition, they give room for South countries to participate 
in intermediate goods trade, in contrast to SS.  This is made possible by international product 
fragmentation.  This is related to the work of Chase (2005), which contends that the principal 
attraction of PTAs is the opportunity they create for businesses to reorganize operations and 
maximize profits.  Together with Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), he criticized the fact that too 9 
 
much emphasis is given to trade creation and diversion as the main criterion for PTA 
formation.
13  He argued that a country will seek a trading bloc in order for producers to move 
stages of production across borders.  If different stages of production can be located in different 
locations where each can be performed most efficiently, then producer profit is maximized.  
Since barriers to trade and investment restrict opportunities of a country to take advantage of 
differences in wages, skills, and capital costs among countries, forming a trading bloc will enable 
countries to take advantage of such opportunities.  Hence, if there is potential for producers to 
engage in international product fragmentation that makes production more efficient, the greater 
is the probability that a trading bloc will be formed.   
Using NAFTA as an example, Chase showed that U.S. multinationals sought free trade 
with Mexico and Canada to allow them to reorganize factories, outsource labor intensive tasks, 
and rescale production.  This implies that the trade policy of a country is essentially endogenous.  
However, this is in contrast to the mainstream literature of endogenous trade policy were firms 
are mostly characterized as seeking trade protection.
14  The reason for this is that the firms 
represented in these studies are import competing firms.  According to Bagwell and Staiger 
(2003), these studies ignore other production sectors that might press for less protection.  They 
contend that a reciprocal trade agreement that lowers import tariffs may be highly valued by 
exporting firms and domestic firms that substantially use imported inputs.  This is related to the 
works of Lipson (1982), Milner (1993), Cantwell (1994), Cheng, Liu, and Yang (1998), and 
Blanchard (2005), which argued that trade policies of a country are related to the international 
economic activities of its firms.  In particular, when countries have more firms involved in 
                                                 
13 Similar criticism was put forth by Harilal and Beena (2003) that the traditional analysis of PTAs based on trade 
creation and trade diversion suffer from failure to take into account the interaction between final and intermediate 
goods.  
14 See for instance Mayer (1984), Magee, Brock, and Young (1989), Dornbusch and Frankel (1987), Bohara and 
Kaempfer (1991), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Henriques and Sadorsky (1994), Krol (1995).   10 
 
international product fragmentation and global intra firm trade, there is more pressure for trade 
liberalization since trade barriers are additional trade costs.  In addition, when countries 
participate in international division of labor, they receive more gains from trade; the most 
important ones may be non pecuniary such as productivity gains and expansion of network.  
Therefore, setting high tariffs may dissipate these possible gains from trade.   
Empirical studies on PTA formation have so far failed to recognize the two points that I 
am raising here.  Most empirical studies on the determinants of PTAs focus on the factors 
driving their formation irrespective of the PTA type
15.  Though theoretical studies obviously 
suggest that different types of countries have different motivations when they seek a particular 
country type as a partner, empirical studies have pooled different PTA types together.  In 
addition, most empirical studies predict whether PTAs will be formed between a developed and 
developing country, two developing, or two developed countries based on the factors that 
influence PTA formation.  However, there is no consensus among these studies.  For instance, 
Ethier (1998), Krueger (1999), and Baier and Bergstrand (2004) predict that PTAs will be more 
likely between developed and developing countries; while Magee (2003) predicts that PTAs will 
be more likely between two developed or two developing countries.  What is lacking in the 
empirical literature is an explanation of what drives countries at different levels of development 
to choose certain countries as their partner.  For instance, it would be interesting to ask, “Given a 
choice of North countries, what makes a North choose another North?”  Similarly, “Given a 
choice of South countries, what makes a North country choose a specific South country?”   Or 
“Can international product fragmentation influence North South PTA formation?”  Asking these 
types of questions maybe a more worthwhile exercise than trying to predict which types of 
                                                 
15 By PTA type I mean North South, North North, and South South PTAs.   11 
 
countries will form a PTA, since all PTAs are formed by almost all countries at different levels 
of development anyway.    
 
III.  Theoretical Framework 
       A.  A Case for Disaggregating PTAs by Country Pair Type 
Table 1.  Models of PTA Formation 
Krugman                      
(1991b)
Frankel, Stein, and Wei 
(1998)
Spilimbergo and Stein 
(1998)
Intermediate 
Deardorff and Stern 
(1994)
Zero Transportation Cost
Haveman                      
(1996)
Countries must be 
geographically distant
Spilimbergo and Stein 
(1998)
Countries must be 
geographically proximate
Ethier                           
(1982)
Zero Transportation Cost
Jones and Kierzkowski 
(1990)





Dissimilar Countries Cost Differentials Intra-industry  Intermediate 
Countries must be 
geographically proximate
Similar 
Product Variety Gains / 
Economies of Scale
Intra-industry 
Cost Differentials Inter-industry  Final 
 Models
Types of Countries 
(Based on Factor 
Endowments)





   
Table 1 provides a summary of the theoretical models that may help explain PTA 
formation.  Based on the natural trading partners hypothesis, countries that already have a 
significant trading relationship and are geographically proximate have more tendency to form 
PTAs, since trade diversion is minimized.  However, based on above models, the impact of 
trading relationship and geographical proximity may depend on the types of countries.  It is 
obvious that factors that influence countries to form PTAs vary with different country types.  If 
countries are classified into two types based on their relative factor endowments, where North 12 
 
countries are relatively capital abundant and South countries are relatively labor abundant, there 
will be three possible types of PTAs. 
1.  North North PTAs 
  North countries may want to form PTAs with each other to take advantage of product 
variety gains and economies of scale in trading differentiated final and intermediate goods, 
which means that trade is mostly intra industry.  Therefore, as suggested by the natural trading 
partners hypothesis, North countries will have a greater tendency to form PTAs with each other 
if they have significant intra industry trade.  In addition, theories suggest that they should be 
geographically proximate or located in the same region to minimize trade costs.   
2.  South South PTAs 
  Similar to North North PTAs, due to similarity of factor endowments, one may argue that 
South countries may want to form PTAs with each other to take advantage of product variety 
gains and economies of scale, so that trade is mostly intra industry.  However, the literature on 
intra industry trade suggest that intra industry trade among similar countries is a phenomenon 
more common for high income countries since it requires a certain degree of income level and a 
market large enough to accommodate each differentiated good.
16  In addition, intra industry trade 
is a phenomenon more common for manufactured goods, which are mostly produced in high 
income countries.
17  It is possible though that South countries trade in intermediate goods that are 
labor intensive.  Labor intensive intermediate goods may be traded by one South country to 
another for further processing into yet another labor intensive intermediate good.  Based on 
theories presented, since a South South country pair seems to have lesser basis for and gains 
from trading with each other compared to North North country pairs
 18, then geographical 
                                                 
16 Helpman and Krugman (1985) 
17 Helpman and Krugman (1989) 
18 As well as North South country pairs, as will be discussed next 13 
 
proximity should be a primary concern so that the possible trade gains will not be outweighed by 
costs associated with distance.   
3.  North South PTAs 
  The main motivation for dissimilar countries, meanwhile, is to take advantage of cost 
differentials.  Theories suggest that dissimilar countries may trade in both final and intermediate 
goods, where the former is inter industry and the latter is intra industry.  Therefore, as suggested 
by the natural trading partners hypothesis, dissimilar countries will have a greater tendency to 
form PTAs with each other if they have significant inter industry trade in final goods and intra 
industry trade in intermediate goods.  With regard to geographical proximity, there is no 
consensus among theories whether distance should be a primary concern or not for dissimilar 
countries forming a PTA.  However, it is reasonable to argue that countries should not be too 
distant with each other such that the gains from cheaper access to goods are outweighed by costs 
associated with distance.   
  The aforementioned leads to the following: 
Hypothesis 1:  The relevance of trading relationship and geographical proximity as factors 
influencing PTA formation varies across different country pairs.   
 (i)  Trading Relationship 
  Inter industry trade as a driving force of PTA formation is expected to be most significant 
for  orth South country pairs since only this type of country pair has the motive for trading 
across different industries.  However, in reality since countries of the same type are not perfectly 
identical, then inter industry trade may be significant as well for both  orth  orth and South 
South country pairs, though the effect may not be as large as that for  orth South country pairs.   
  The impact of intra industry trade on PTA formation is expected to be largest for  orth 
 orth country pairs, since this type of country pair mostly engage in such type of trade.  Intra 14 
 
industry trade is expected to be significant as well for  orth South country pairs, as they engage 
in intra industry trade in intermediate goods, though the effect may not be as large as that for 
 orth  orth country pairs.  Intra industry trade is expected to be an insignificant factor for 
South South country pairs.   
(ii)  Geographical Proximity/Distance 
Since South South country pairs have least basis for and gains from trading with each 
other compared to  orth  orth and  orth South country pairs, then geographical proximity 
should be a primary concern for South South country pairs, so that any possible trade gains will 
not be outweighed by costs associated with distance.  Therefore, the role of distance is expected 
to be largest for South South country pairs compared to the other two country pairs.  
Geographical proximity is expected to be significant as well for  orth South and  orth  orth 
country pairs, so that the gains from access to cheaper goods, and product variety gains from 
trade and economies of scale, respectively, will not be outweighed by costs associated with 
distance.   
       B.  A Case for the Possible Role of IPF on PTA Formation 
  Now, consider possible relationships that are not obvious when different country types 
are pooled together.  One of these is the possible role of IPF (international product 
fragmentation) in the formation of North South PTAs.  This section first presents countries’ 
motivation to undergo product fragmentation at the international scale. Then, different cases are 






            B.1  Motivation for IPF 
Jones and Kierzkowski (1990), Ethier (1982), and numerous other studies
19 have shown 
that trade in intermediate goods between dissimilar countries can be largely explained by IPF.  In 
a Ricardian setting with a manufactured good and two countries – home and foreign, which are 
similar in all aspects except for technology, countries are shown to have an incentive to fragment 
the production of the manufactured good across international borders.  Suppose home has the 
comparative advantage in producing the entire manufactured good.  Furthermore, the production 
of the good is separable into two production blocs, where each bloc requires a different 
technology.  It is possible that although foreign has comparative disadvantage in producing the 
entire manufactured good, that it has comparative advantage in producing the good’s 
components in one of the two production blocs.   
  The same analysis can be applied under a Heckscher Ohlin framework, where the two 
production blocs can be assumed to have different factor intensities and home and foreign 
countries have different factor endowments.  Suppose that the first production bloc is relatively 
more capital intensive and the second is relatively more labor intensive.  If home is relatively 
more capital abundant and foreign is relatively more labor abundant, this implies that home will 
have an incentive to pass the second production bloc to foreign.  This result can be extended to a 
multi country and multi production bloc setting, where the more capital intensive production 
blocs are produced in the relatively more capital abundant countries.  This is similar to 
Helpman’s (1981) model of differentiated final and middle products   a country with higher 
capital labor ratio produces varieties from at least one commodity group
20 such that the capital 
                                                 
19 See for instance Jones (2000), and Cheng and Kierzkowski (2001), Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), Kimura (2001) 
and Ando (2005).    
20 A commodity group consist of the different varieties of the same good.   16 
 
intensity of this group is higher than the capital intensity of all groups being produced in capital 
poor countries.   
  The implication of the works of both Jones and Kierzkowski, and Ethier is that since IPF 
enables production of different components of a final good at the lowest cost, then marginal costs 
of final good producers fall.  Hence, the price of the manufactured good falls.  A dissimilarity 
between Jones and Kierzkowski, and Ethier is that the latter assumes that the components 
produced in different countries can be costlessly assembled into a final good; that is, no 
international service link costs
21 exist, whereas the former placed great emphasis on service link 
costs as an important factor in determining the existence of IPF.  If service link costs are high, it 
is possible for IPF not to be undertaken.  What is missing in both studies, however, is the 
presence of trade barriers across countries. 
  The foregoing suggests that the overall cost advantage derived from IPF depends on (1) 
cost advantage due to differences in technology or relative factor endowments and (2) cost of 
fragmentation, which includes service link costs and trade barriers.  For the cost of 
fragmentation, I focus on the factors implied by the natural trading partners hypothesis, namely, 
transportation costs and trade barriers.   
  Let t be tariffs and a be transportation cost that takes the form of Samuelson’s iceberg 
cost.  This means that of a unit of a good shipped from one country to another, only a fraction  













τ , which I refer to as the cost of IPF.  Therefore, 
givena, τ increases as t increases; and given t, τ increases as a increases.  Next, let ρ be the cost 
advantage afforded by IPF due to difference in technology or relative factor endowments. If 
                                                 
21 Jones and Kierzkowski defined service link costs as the costs associated with coordination, administration, 
transportation, communication, and financial services that must be necessarily incurred when production process is 
fragmented.   17 
 
ρ >1, this implies that foreign has a comparative advantage in the production of a given fragment 
of a good relative to home, where the comparative advantage is due to difference in technology 




.  Τhis implies that home will only have an incentive to fragment production at the 
international scale when the gains from decreased production costs outweigh the costs of 
international transportation costs and trade barriers; that is when γ >1.   
            B.2  Motivation for PTA Formation due to IPF 
  In this section, a simple model is presented that is tailored to address the prevalence of 
IPF and how it can possibly affect PTA formation.  It is assumed that governments are apolitical 
and a pair of countries’ social planners are making a decision of maximizing their respective 
country’s domestic welfare.  Each country will only have an incentive to form a PTA with the 
other if the change in welfare from moving from a non discriminatory environment of most 
favored nation (MFN) to a PTA is positive, that is  
(1)   W = W
PTA
    W
MFN > 0.   
Therefore, a PTA will be formed between home (h) and foreign (f) only if min ( Wh,  Wf) > 0.   
  Assume that home is relatively capital abundant and foreign is labor abundant.  On this 
basis, home is a North and foreign is a South country.  In addition, the economy has two factors 
of production: capital (K) and labor (L); and three sectors: agriculture (A), intermediate inputs or 
components (V), and manufactures (M).  All goods are produced using both K and L.  A is 
produced under constant returns to scale and M and V under increasing returns to scale.  A is 
produced under a perfectly competitive market, M under a monopolistically competitive market, 
and V under an oligopolistic market.  Production of A is assumed to be labor intensive, while M 
is capital intensive.  The production of M is separable.  There are two components used to 18 
 
produce M.  Component V1 is more labor intensive and V2 more capital intensive.  The assembly 
of the components to produce the final good is assumed to require a technology that is capital 
intensive.  Thus, it can be treated as part of V2.  Given these, the production function of M is 
given by 
(2)  M = f[K, L, V(V1, V2)]. 
Let wK, wL, and wVj be the costs of capital, labor, and component j where j=1, 2.  The total cost 
associated with producing M is therefore given by 
(3)  C = f[wK, wL, wVj(wK, wL)]. 
     Case 1.  No IPF 
  Assume that there is one North and one South country and that the current technology 
does not allow for IPF.  I follow Deardorff (2001) and assume that the two countries have 
sufficiently different factor endowments so that countries are outside the cone of 
diversification.
22    This implies that Home produces all the intermediate inputs needed to 
produce M and that the two countries will trade only in final goods, where North exports M and 
South exports A.   
     Case 2.  IPF, Prohibitive Trade Costs, and Zero Transportation Costs 
  Assume that technological development makes IPF possible.
23  For simplicity, assume 
that components V1 and V2 can be produced in two separate production blocs.  Let the 
production blocs that produce the labor  and capital intensive components be referred to as PBL 
and PBK, respectively.  Since South is labor intensive, then it should have cost advantage in 
                                                 
22 Deardorff (2001) presents a model of fragmentation across cones, where countries fall outside the cone 
diversification.  Due to this, factor price equalization is not achieved even with free trade.  This provides more bases 
for product fragmentation across countries so that countries will be able to take advantage of factor price 
differences.   
23 Jones (2000) mentions that this technological development may be due to advances in information and 
communications technology.  For instance, advances in the computer industry have allowed virtually costless means 
of communication anywhere in the world through the Internet.   19 
 
producing the labor intensive component than North.  Let South’s cost advantage relative to 
North in producing the labor intensive component be equal to ρS.  This implies that the necessary 
condition for North to consider IPF is ρS > 1.  If ρS≤1, IPF will not be even considered.  
However, this is not a sufficient condition for IPF.  When product fragmentation is done at the 
international level, the price of inputs faced by producers of M in North includes not only the 
production costs, but transportation and trade costs as well, that is, τ≠ 1.  This implies that the 
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.  In order to focus on trade costs, let 
a= 0.  This leads to 
 
(5)  ρS > (1 + t).   
 
This implies that there is a maximum level of t that would make IPF a worthwhile activity, which 
I refer to as tIPF.  If the existing tariff rate is too high, that is, t > tIPF, then IPF will not be 
undertaken.  This implies that IPF may put pressure on countries to lower their trade barriers.  
North may lower its trade barriers to intermediate goods coming from South in order to 
undertake IPF.  In fact, given zero transportation costs, (5) will definitely hold when t is set equal 
to zero.  Similarly, Deardorff (2001) emphasized the role of trade barriers in discouraging IPF.  
He showed that trade barriers in intermediate goods may render IPF unprofitable, even when it 
would otherwise lower production costs.   
     Case 3.  IPF, Non Prohibitive Trade Costs, Positive Transportation Costs 
  Assume that there are two South countries, S1 and S2, which are identical.  In each South 
country, there are oligopolistic firms that host PBL.  Since S1 and S2 are identical, this implies 20 
 
that they have the same cost advantage over the North country, which I call N1, in hosting PBL; 
that is, ρS1 = ρS2 > 1.  Assume that the solution concept of firms hosting PBL is Bertrand 
competition.  In equilibrium, as long as both South countries face the same transportation costs 
and trade barriers with respect to N1, the outcome will be the perfectly competitive outcome, 
where firms in both countries will equally share in the market of N1 and price will be equal to 
marginal costs, where the marginal costs include t and a, aside from production costs.
24   
  Under a MFN environment, all firms in both South countries face the same tariffs, tMF .  
However, if the two South countries do not have the same distance from N1, then the cost of V1 
coming from the two South countries will differ due to difference in transportation costs.  For 
instance, S1 is nearer to N1 than S2.  This means that  








































(8)  w1s1 < w1s2. 
In this case, N1 will choose S1 as its low cost provider of V1 and firms in S2 are driven out of 
N1’s market.  This will hold in equilibrium if there is no other way for S2 to undercut the price 
of S1.   
  Suppose that S2 decides to use GATT Article XXIV
25 to undercut S1 to gain N1’s entire 
market, by forging a preferential trading agreement with N1 that results in a tariff level equal to 
                                                 
24 See Mas Colell, Whinston , and Green (1995), page 388 389.   Under Bertrand competition, when oligopolistic 
firms’ price is set above marginal cost, each firm will always have an incentive to undercut each other’s price.  In 
equilibrium, all firms charge a price equal to the marginal cost.  
25 GATT Article XXIV allows for countries to form preferential trading agreements, provided that duties and other 
regulations imposed on countries not part of the agreement are not more restrictive prior to the formation of the 
agreement.   21 
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Since ρS1 = ρS2 by assumption, the inequality will hold if  
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be the ratio of transportation costs.  Since a s1<a s2, then A>1.   














 be the ratio of trade costs faced by North when components are bought from 
S1 and S2.  Since tMF  > tPTA, then D>1.  Therefore, in order for S2 to possibly undercut S1, it 
must be that  
 (11)  D > A > 1 
One way to satisfy this is to set a very low or zero tPTA.  However, even if tPTA drops to zero, (11) 
is not necessarily satisfied.  This may happen if S2 is sufficiently far and S1 is very near N1.  In 
this case, it is possible to have D < A.  This implies that S2 cannot just form a PTA with N1 to 
undercut S1 as the low cost provider of N1.  Only when (11) is satisfied could S2 undercut S1.  
Nevertheless, just the threat of S2 undercutting S1 will give the latter an incentive to negotiate 
with N1 to form a PTA.  Once N1 chooses S1 as its source of V1, it is rational for S1 to initiate a 
negotiation with N1 to form a PTA to secure its position as the low cost provider of N1.  22 
 
Through this, S1 ensures that γs1 > γs2.  Therefore, in equilibrium, N1 and S1 form a PTA and S2 
is driven out of N1’s market.
26   
  What the foregoing shows is that trade policy may be influenced by IPF.  In Case 2, even 
when transportation costs are zero, if trade costs are high then IPF will not be undertaken.  This 
may put pressure on the country that wants to take advantage of IPF to lower its trade costs.  In 
Case 3, even if IPF is already being undertaken, IPF can influence trade policy when a country 
wants to secure its trading relationship with another country.   
  The aforementioned suggests that IPF can possibly influence trade policy by encouraging 
North and South countries to form a PTA, which leads to the following: 
Hypothesis 2:  IPF has a positive impact on the probability that a  orth South country pair 
would form a PTA. 
       C.  Net Impact on Domestic Welfare of IPF Under MFN or PTA 
  Using Case 3, I consider the impact on domestic welfare of IPF under MFN and PTA by 
using the following representation of change in a country’s domestic welfare
27: 
(12)  dW =  p*⋅dQ   e⋅dp*, 
where p* denotes foreign prices, Q denotes domestic production, e > 0 denotes an imported 
good, and e < 0 denotes an exported good.  The first term on the right hand side represents the 
effect of volume of trade changes to domestic welfare, while the second term represents effect of 
terms of trade changes to domestic welfare.  
                                                 
26 If the strategic variable chosen was quantity instead of price, then Cournot equilibrium is the outcome, where both 
S1 and S2 can share in N1’s market.  As long as the quantity chosen by the both countries does not result in a price 
of components that is greater than the price of those components at N1, then this is a possible outcome.  However, if 
the quantity chosen by both countries increases price substantially, then IPF may become unprofitable for N1 and so 
both S1 and S2 will be driven out of N1’s market.  Though Cournot competition may be used to model the behavior 
of S1 and S2, Bertrand price competition seems to be the more appropriate model to link IPF and PTA formation.  
The reason for this is that N1 uses IPF to take advantage of cost differentials; hence, price is the more logical choice 
of strategic variable rather than quantity.   
27 See Helpman and Krugman (1989), page 23 24, for derivation.   23 
 
When tariffs are lowered from a MFN environment to a PTA between North and South, 
the volume of trade between the two countries increases, exclusive of any increase caused by 
IPF.  The increase in volume of trade does not only include trade in final goods, but trade in 
intermediate goods as well.  Thus, the first term is unambiguously positive for both countries.  
The impact on terms of trade for the North and South countries are different.  For the South 
country, the decline in PM decreases the price of its importable good.  The reduction of tariffs due 
to a movement from a MFN environment to PTA increases the price of South’s export goods – 
V1 and A.  Therefore, South’s terms of trade unambiguously improves.   Hence, together with the 
impact on South’s volume of trade, the movement from a MFN environment to PTA is certainly 
welfare improving for the South country.   
The impact on North’s terms of trade is ambiguous.  Since the price of its export good, 
PM, falls as a result of IPF, a negative impact is exerted on its terms of trade.  However, the 
movement from a MFN environment to PTA reduces the price it faces for its imported 
intermediate goods, which exerts a positive impact on its terms of trade.  Hence, the net impact 
on North’s terms of trade is uncertain.  The net impact on its domestic welfare is likewise 
ambiguous.  However, what is apparent is that the terms of trade motive for the North country to 
raise tariffs is reduced or may even be eliminated since it does not only trade in final products 
but also in components used in the latter’s production.  Since production of V1 ceases in the 
North due to IPF, then there will be less incentive for North to raise tariffs as it becomes fully 
dependent on South for supply of such components.  Lowering tariff to the supplier of 
intermediate goods seems to be a reasonable policy for North.  This is reinforced when there are 
few South countries that can possibly supply V1.  Raising tariffs may come at a great cost to 
producers of M in the North country.  Given these, if MFN tariffs are too high, IPF can therefore 
motivate a North country to form a PTA with its low cost provider South.   24 
 
Though not represented in (12), Deardorff (2001) and Arndt (1998) point out that the 
lower price of imported inputs faced by producers of M in North lowers the price of the final 
manufactured good.  Hence, if M is a large proportion of consumers’ budget, then real incomes 
could rise in both countries, which further increase domestic welfare.
28   
  The foregoing has focused on the possibility that trade policy is formed from the point of 
view of exporters that are highly dependent on imported inputs.  This is in contrast to the 
traditional literature that has focused on the formation of trade policy from the point of view of 
import competing domestic firms, where trade policy is motivated to protect them and extract 
rents from foreign competitors.  In the simple model presented, both countries have an incentive 
to negotiate for a preferential trading agreement to lower tariffs.  The importing North country 
has an incentive to enter into a PTA to lower the cost of intermediate inputs used by its 
exporters.  The South country, meanwhile, apart from the positive impact on its volume of trade 
and terms of trade of lower tariffs, has an incentive to enter into a PTA in order to secure its 
trading relationship with the North country.  Thus, I have shown that it is possible to satisfy 
equation (1) for both countries, which in turn implies that min( Wh,  Wf) > 0 and therefore, a 
PTA will be formed between the two countries.    
 
                                                 
28 This representation of the domestic welfare function is chosen for model simplicity and tractability.  Though the 
possible loss in tariff revenue due to PTA formation is not accounted for, I do not downplay its possible importance.  
Several studies have shown that reduction in tax revenues need not necessarily result in lower domestic welfare.  For 
instance,  Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) contend that tariff reduction may be socially beneficial even when it is 
accompanied by reduction in total revenue because the increased openness of a country can lead not only to 
increased trade volumes, but to allocative efficiency of resources.  Thus, trade liberalization may to some degree pay 
for itself.  Walkenhorst (2006), meanwhile, argue that if tariff reductions (to levels above zero) generate a more 
than proportional increase in trade flows, then government revenues from trade taxes need not fall.  In addition, 
revenues from sales and income taxes are likely to grow because of higher domestic consumption arising from lower 
prices of tradables, and higher growth resulting from the improved allocation of resources in the economy.  Others 
such as Keen and Ligthart (2001) and Clarete and Whalley (1987) suggest that countries should complement tariff 
reductions with domestic tax reforms (strengthening domestic indirect taxes, broadening the tax base, and increasing 
the administrative efficiency of domestic tax collection) to fully reap the benefits of the former.   
 25 
 
IV.  Empirical Methodology and Data 
In order to test my hypotheses, following Baier and Bergstrand (2004), I use the 
qualitative choice model of McFadden (1975)
29.  Qualitative choice models provide a framework 
to estimate the probability that a pair of countries’ governments or social planners is making a 
decision as if maximizing their respective agents’ utilities in the absence of actual observations 
of utility.
30  Related to this, I assume that when social planners make a decision to form a PTA, 
they ignore the impact of their decision on nonmember countries. 
Let Z be a latent variable that represents the difference in utility levels from the formation 
of a PTA.  Assume that a PTA will be formed by the governments of home and foreign only 
when the change in domestic welfare from doing so for both countries is positive.  The 
difference in welfare levels and hence of the probability that a PTA will be formed depends on a 
vector of variables, X.  These can be represented by the following:  
(13)  Z = min( Wh,  Wf)               
(14)  Z = α + Xβ + ε               
where β is a vector of parameters and ε is an error term assumed to be independent of X.  Since 
Z is unobservable, an indicator variable, PTA* is set to be equal 1 when Z > 0; that is, when a 
PTA is formed; and equal to 0 when Z ≤0; that is, when a PTA is not formed.  Therefore, the 
response probability, P, for PTA* is: 
  (15)  P(PTA* = 1) = P(Z > 0) = G (α + Xβ)         
where G( ) is the cumulative distribution function.   
  To test Hypothesis 1and 2, the following variables are included in X:   
                                                 
29 Wooldridge (2002) 
30 Baier and Bergstrand (2004) 26 
 
  Distance between country pairs is used to account for geographical proximity.  Based on 
the natural trading partners hypothesis, distance is expected to be negatively related to the 
probability of a PTA being formed for any country pair, but the weight of its importance may 
differ per country pair, as pointed out in Hypothesis 1(ii).   
  Total bilateral merchandise trade is used to measure the volume of trade between 
countries.  It is expected to be positively related to the probability of PTA formation for all 
country pairs, as suggested by the natural trading partners hypothesis.  To test Hypothesis 1(i), 
total bilateral trade is decomposed into inter industry and intra industry trades.
31  Total net trade 
for each country pair is used to account for inter industry trade.  Based on Hypothesis 1(i), this 
variable is expected to be most significant for North South country pairs.  The Grubel Lloyd 
intra industry trade index (IIT) for each country pair is used to account for intra industry trade.  
It is used as a proxy variable for trade in differentiated final goods for North North country pairs 
and trade in intermediate goods for North South country pairs.  Based on Hypothesis 1(i), it is 
expected to be positive and significant for North North and North South country pairs, but not 
for South South country pairs.
32   
IIT for North South country pairs is likewise used as a proxy for IPF.  Based on existing 
literature, countries with dissimilar factor endowments that engage in international product 
fragmentation have substantial intra industry trade.
33  If IIT is positively related to the 
                                                 
31 A detailed explanation of how inter  and intra industry trades are calculated is contained in the Appendix. 
32 The GL index as a measure of intra industry trade has been subject to many criticisms.  Menon (1994) provides a 
short summary of these criticisms.  Despite the criticisms, however, there is no consensus as to what alternative 
measure is superior to it.  Thus, I use the GL index to measure IIT. 
33 See for instance Cheng and Kierzkowski (2001), Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), Kimura (2001), Kleinert (2003), 
and Ando (2005).   27 
 
probability of a PTA being formed for North South country pairs, then this provides support for 
Hypothesis 2.
34  
According to Menon and Dixon (1996), activities in industries classified under the 3 digit 
SITC commodity classification tend to have similar capital and labor requirements, and so 
disaggregation up to this level is sufficient to capture inter  and intra industry trade patterns.  
However, some studies argue that patterns of inter  and intra industry trades may just be a purely 
statistical artifact due to categorical aggregation of industries.
35  To address this concern, inter  
and intra industry trades are measured using the 4 digit SITC level of commodity classification.   
  In addition to these four variables, X contains other possible determinants of PTA that 
have been recognized in the literature.  The set of control variables includes both economic and 
political variables.  This is in contrast to Baier and Bergstrand (2004), which included only 
economic variables as explanatory variables of PTA formation.   
First, the difference in real GDP per country pair is used as a proxy for the difference in 
economic size.  According to Michaely (1998), small countries will always prefer to form a 
trading agreement with a large country
36 than with a small one and that a trading agreement 
between a large and a small country will always generate losses for the larger country (in the 
absence of transfer payments)
37.   Hence, although a small country may prefer to form a trading 
agreement with a large country, a large country may not be willing to form a trading agreement 
with a small one.  Thus, a trading agreement will most likely be formed between countries of 
                                                 
34 Note that IIT was used to measure different things in different country pair types.  This is possible since intra 
industry trade occurring in North North and North South country pairs are due to different motivations.  See the 
Appendix of Variables for a brief explanation.  
35 See Menon (1994) for a list of some of these studies and a short discussion about this.   
36 A larger country is expected to be less specialized, less unique, more diversified, and closer in its relative price 
pattern to the rest of the world, creating more trade creation opportunities for the smaller country.   
37 In reality, the larger country can demand various concessions from the small country to agree to form the 
agreement.   28 
 
similar size.  As the difference in size of two countries increases, the less likely that a large 
country will want to form a trading agreement with a small country.   
Second, the difference in capital to labor ratio is used to account for potential trade 
between two countries and difference in their levels of economic development.  According to 
standard trade theories
38, countries with dissimilar technologies or factor endowments will 
potentially benefit from trading with each other due to comparative advantage gains from trade.  
Thus, this variable is expected to be positively related to North South PTA formation.  However, 
Levy (1997) presented a political argument with regard to countries’ factor endowments as a 
predictor of PTA formation. In particular, he argued that trade agreements may be politically 
more feasible when the disparity in factor endowments is minimal.
39  Thus, this variable may be 
negatively related to the probability of PTA formation.   
Third, the square of the difference in capital to labor ratio is included to account for 
possible non linearities.  For instance, countries with more divergent capital to labor ratios may 
have a greater probability of forming a PTA.  However, it is possible that the probability may 
start to fall as the divergence increases beyond a certain level.   
Fourth, the difference between each country pair’s financial openness is included.  The 
Chinn and Ito (2007) Index of financial openness was used to account for a country’s degree of 
financial openness.  The difference in this index for each country pair is included to account for 
the possibility that countries may consider the regulations on cross border financial transactions 
and degree of capital account openness of a potential partner country.
40 
                                                 
38 Ricardian or Heckscher Ohlin  
39 As an anecdotal evidence, Levy (1997) compared the approval of the U.S. House and Senate on the Canadian US 
Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The former sailed 
through both chambers with little controversy, but the latter became a divisive political issue.   
40 A summary of the components of the index is provided in the Appendix. 29 
 
Fifth, the trade balance of each country pair is included.  According to Magee (2003), 
countries with large bilateral trade deficit will have many lobby groups that will oppose a trading 
agreement.  Hence, when trade is more balanced between two countries, the lesser would be the 
lobbying against a trading agreement and the greater is the probability that a PTA will be formed 
between them.   
Sixth, the difference in UN (United Nations) voting patterns of a country pair with 
respect to the US vote is used as a political proximity variable.  When a country pair supports the 
same policies in UN, it may be easier to form a trading agreement since political conflict may be 
less likely.
41   
Seventh, a dummy variable to indicate whether both countries are democracies or not is 
included.  According to Mitra et al. (2002), democratic governments place more weight on social 
welfare than dictatorships do.  Hence, if PTAs are welfare improving, then when both countries 
have democratic governments, there is a greater probability that a PTA will be formed between 
them.   
Eighth, a dummy variable to indicate whether a country pair shares the same language is 
included.  Same language may represent same culture or imply ease of negotiating.  Hence, 
countries with the same language are expected to have a greater probability of forming a PTA.   
Finally, dummy variables were added to control for regional fixed effects.
42  Although 
distance may be sufficient to account for geographical proximity, regional dummies were added 
to control for peculiar regional characteristics.
43 Appendix Table 3 lists the variables considered, 
their corresponding definitions, and sources.  
                                                 
41 This variable is discussed in more detail in the Appendix. 
42 I added eight regional dummies, namely, Africa, North America, Latin America, East Asia, Middle East, Other 
Asia, Europe, and Oceania.  
43 For instance, regional dummies may capture differences in infrastructure and natural resources across regions. 30 
 
    The hypothesis that the relative importance of the factors affecting PTA formation may 
be different for each country pair is first tested.  To be able to distinguish the country pairs, 
countries were first classified into North and South.  The classification was based on the average 
human development index (HDI) rating of the countries from 1980 2000.
44  Countries with HDI 
rating of 0.80 and above are classified as North.  The rest are classified as South.  Appendix 
Table 4 lists the countries under each classification.  Using this classification, there are 41 
countries classified as North and 94 countries classified as South.  All country pairs were initially 
pooled and dummy variables, CPi (i = NN, NS, SS), were assigned to the different country pairs.  
Using North North as the base category (North South and South South country pairs are used as 
well as the base categories to confirm the results), the following dummy variables are defined:  
                  1,  if North South country pair 
CPNS  = 
                  0,  otherwise  
(16)              
                  1,  if South South country pair 
CPSS  = 
                  0,  otherwise  
 
These dummy variables were then interacted with all elements of X.
45  Introducing the 
interaction terms and dummy variables, results in the following estimating equation: 
(17)  PTA* = α + CPNS + CPSS + Xβ +  CPNS *Xβ + CPSS *Xβ + ε.       
CPNS and CPSS represent the change in intercept relative to the base category, while the 
interaction terms represent the change in slope relative to the base category.  Equation (17) is 
estimated using probit.  If the interaction terms are significant, then a support is found for 
Hypothesis 1.  Therefore, it is worthwhile to estimate the following for each country pair and 
compare their corresponding β's: 
                                                 
44 I use HDI as the basis of classifying countries since it is the most accepted classification of developed and 
developing countries since it measures development beyond income.   
45 Except for the regional dummies 31 
 
(18)  PTA* = α + Xβ + ε               
  Though many existing PTAs are multilateral, similar to other studies, the decision to 
enter a PTA is treated as bilateral.  The reason for this is that every country in a PTA is assumed 
to decide bilaterally whether the net national welfare gain from a PTA with another country 
warrants formation.  In addition, as Baier and Bergstrand point out, every country in an existing 
PTA has the ability to veto the addition of another country in a PTA.   
  In specifying the estimating equation, most studies use contemporaneous variables to 
explain PTA formation.  However, several issues arise when contemporaneous explanatory 
variables are used.   First is the problem of reverse causality.  For instance, if total bilateral trade 
in year t is used to explain PTA formation in year t and a positive relationship is found, one 
cannot be really sure which way the causality proceeds.  It is highly probable that PTA formation 
could have enhanced the volume of trade.  Second is the reality that PTA formation in a given 
year cannot be really attributed to factors
46 in that same year.  The reason for this is the fact that 
a PTA takes years to negotiate.  Even when countries start negotiating in a given year, the factors 
that could have prompted them to start negotiations may not even be the factors on the same 
year.
47 
Above issues are addressed by using past values of explanatory variables.  A year for the 
explanatory variables, say t s, is chosen to explain PTAs formed by year t.  In addition, country 
pairs that already have a PTA in year t s are excluded from the sample.  Thus, the estimates will 
show the effect of year t s characteristics on the probability that a pair of countries without a 
PTA in year t s will choose each other as partners in a PTA over the next s years.
48   
                                                 
46 Time varying factors 
47 For instance, Baier and Bergstrand argued that the European Economic Community was negotiated over 10 years.   
48 Several other studies have done this.  For instance, Magee (2003), and Baier and Bergstrand (2004).   32 
 
  An examination of the growth rates of PTAs from 1980 2006 (See Appendix Figure 1) 
shows different patterns of growth before and after 1995, implying a structural break.  Based on 
this, it can be inferred that the relative importance of the factors that have affected PTA 
formation prior to 1995 and thereafter are different.  Hence, the sample is divided into two 
periods.  First, the effect of 1980 characteristics on the probability that a pair of countries without 
a PTA in 1980 will have one by 1995 is examined.
49  There are 3,900 North South, 778 North 
North, and 4,242 South South country pair observations used to predict 1995 PTA formation.  
Second, the effect of 1995 characteristics on the probability that a pair of countries without a 
PTA in 1995 will have one by 2006 is examined.  There are 3,770 North South, 650 North 
North, and 4,062 South South country pair observations used to predict 2006 PTA formation.
50  
Appendix Table 5 presents the summary statistics for each of the country pairs for both periods. 
  The aforementioned suggests that PTA formation from 1980 2006 may be modeled as a 
sequential decision making process.  The probabilities for the two periods are determined as 
follows: 
P1 = F(β1 X) 
P2 = [1   F(β1 X)] F(β2 X) 
where F represents the standard normal distribution function; and β1 and β2 are vectors of the 
model parameters.  Vector X contains the explanatory variables.  β1 is estimated over the entire 
sample, while β2 is estimated over the sample of country pairs that do not have a PTA in 1995.  A 
sequential probit can be simply estimated as binary probit by appropriately choosing the samples 
                                                 
49 1980 is used as the starting year of the study due to data constraints.  The PTAs formed prior to 1980 and are 
therefore excluded in the regressions are: EC (Treaty of Rome); EFTA (Stockholm Convention); CACM; 
TRIPARTITE; EFTA Accession of Ireland,; EC OCTs; PYN; GSTP; EC Accession of Denmark, Ireland, and UK; 
EC Switzerland and Liechtenstein; EC Iceland; EC Norway; CARICOM; EC Algeria; Bangkok Agreement; 
PATCRA; EC Syria.   
50 Refer back to Appendix Table 4 for a breakdown of country pairs.   33 
 
in each period.  For the first period, the probability that a pair of countries without a PTA in 1980 
will form one by 1995 is estimated; and for the second period, the probability that a pair of 
countries without a PTA in 1995 will form one by 2006 is estimated.  Figure 1 portrays the 
sequential decision making process and indicates the samples on which the estimation of each 
period occurs.  
 
Figure 1.  PTA Formation in 1980 2006 as a Sequential Process 
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Aforementioned methodology has limitations since I am unable to fully account for 
dynamic factors.  There may be factors in other years that could have prompted countries to form 
PTAs in succeeding years, but such factors are not captured in the specification.  For instance, 
one may argue that the uncertainties in the Uruguay Round may have caused the dramatic 
growth in PTAs prior to 1995.  While this may be true, my methodology will be adequate to 
address my hypotheses.  In the face of an impasse of multilateral negotiations, my methodology 
will be able to tell how countries chose their partners and what factors make countries choose 
particular countries over others.  In addition, my specification may not be able to capture all 
relevant factors that have prompted PTA formation.  For instance, the impact of the 1997 1998 
financial crises is not captured in the specification, but could have influenced countries to seek 34 
 
PTAs.  To possibly address this, a financial openness variable is added to at least take into 
account the financial side of the economy.  I proceed with the caveat in mind that not all relevant 
factors are captured by my methodology and model specification.   
 
V.  Results 
A.  Pooled Sample 
Table 2. Test of Difference in Coefficients across Country Pairs 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Base Category
Is the coefficient for this country pair 
significantly different from the base 
category?
NS SS NN SS NN NS
Distance yes yes yes yes yes yes
Total Bilateral Trade yes yes yes no yes no
Inter-industry Trade yes yes yes no no no
Intra-industry Trade yes yes yes no yes no
Distance yes no yes yes no yes
Total Bilateral Trade no no no yes no yes
Inter-industry Trade no no no yes yes yes
Intra-industry Trade yes yes yes yes yes yes
NN NS SS
Panel A. PTAs formed from 1981-1995
Panel B. PTAs formed from 1996-2006
 
 
Table 2 summarizes the results of pooling all countries in a single estimation.  The 
question of interest is whether a given coefficient for a given country pair is significantly 
different from the chosen base country pair.  Columns 1 and 2 use North North country pair as 
the base category, Columns 3 and 4 use North South, and Columns 5 and 6 use South South.
51  
Panel A tests the difference of coefficients for PTAs formed from 1981 1995, while Panel B tests 
for those PTAs formed from 1996 2006.  If the coefficient of interest for a given country pair is 
                                                 
51 Apart from the control variables, the estimating equation includes two variables of interest at a time only.  For 
instance, one estimation includes distance and total bilateral trade only, aside from the other X explanatory 
variables.  Another includes distance and inter industry trade only and another includes distance and intra industry 
trade only.   35 
 
significantly different from that of the base country pair at 10% level of significance, yes is 
indicated in the corresponding cell, otherwise no is indicated.   
 For PTAs formed from 1980 to 1995, Panel A consistently reveals that the weight of 
distance on the probability of PTA formation is significantly different across the three country 
pairs regardless of the base category used.  Likewise, the coefficient of total bilateral trade is 
significantly different across country pairs, except for North South and South South country 
pairs, as seen in columns (4) and (6).  When total bilateral trade is disaggregated into inter  and 
intra industry trades, there is  some evidence that the impact of inter  and intra industry trades 
in driving PTA formation are significantly different across the three country pairs.  However, it 
is apparent that the effect of intra industry trade for North South and South South PTAs are not 
significantly different from each other, as seen in Columns (4) and (6).  The results in Panel A 
lend some support to the hypothesis that the role of trading relationship on PTA formation varies 
per country pair.   
  When PTAs formed from 1996 2006 are considered, a quite different picture is revealed.   
The impact of distance on the probability of PTA formation is still significantly different across 
the three country pairs, except for its impact on North North and South South country pairs, as 
seen in columns (2) and (5).  The coefficient of total bilateral trade is not significantly different 
for the three country pairs, except for North South and South South country pairs, as seen in 
columns (4) and (6).  Disaggregating total bilateral trade into inter  and intra industry trades 
shows some support for the hypothesis that the role of trading relationship across country pairs is 
different.  This is especially apparent for the coefficient of intra industry trade, which shows that 
its impact on the probability of PTA formation is significantly different across the three country 
pairs regardless of the base category used.   36 
 
The results in Panels A and B reveal that not only is there evidence that the role of 
distance, total bilateral, inter , and intra industry trades on PTA formation differ across country 
pairs in a single period, but that the importance of these factors are different for each period.  For 
both periods considered, disaggregating total bilateral trade into inter and intra industry trades 
shows support for the hypothesis that the impact of trading relationship as a factor driving PTA 
formation is different across country pairs.   
B.  Disaggregated Sample 
 
















Distance (in log) 1.8279 2.0781 0.4251 2.0781 2.1046 1.4484
Total Bilateral Trade (in log) 9.5642 9.0576 12.4039 9.9749 9.8508 12.9143
Net Trade (in log) 9.6939 9.2246 12.3241 10.178 10.070 12.7411
Intra-Industry Trade Index 0.0553 0.0380 0.1518 0.0739 0.0689 0.1933
North-South
Distance (in log) 1.9582 1.9956 0.6933 1.9956 2.0122 1.5124
Total Bilateral Trade (in log) 6.3444 6.2265 8.9752 7.0742 6.9032 12.0408
Net Trade (in log) 6.6044 6.5380 8.8477 7.4251 7.2694 11.9494
Intra-Industry Trade Index 0.0121 0.0113 0.0563 0.0241 0.0224 0.0736
South-South
Distance (in log) 1.8645 1.9181 0.6552 1.9181 1.9397 0.2544
Total Bilateral Trade (in log) 2.6314 2.5114 5.3371 3.3168 3.2987 4.7060
Net Trade (in log) 2.7447 2.5978 6.0593 3.6737 3.6589 4.8081




Before presenting the results, it is worthwhile to describe the characteristics of the 
different country pairs.  Table 3 presents the means of each country pair for distance and the 
trade variables.  For the period 1980 1995, it is noticeable that the mean distance of the country 
pairs that formed PTAs in this period is well below the mean of those that did not form a PTA.  
For the period 1996 2006, except for South South country pairs, the mean distance of country 
pairs that formed PTAs increased, suggesting that some countries may have already exhausted 37 
 
their proximate neighboring countries as PTA partners in the earlier period.  Nevertheless, 
similar as in the earlier period, the mean distance of countries that have formed PTAs is still way 
below the mean of those that did not form a PTA.  For the trade variables, the averages for the 
country pairs that have formed PTAs are higher than those that did not form a PTA.  This is true 
for all country pairs and periods.  An exception is the intra industry trade index for SS country 
pairs. The mean for the countries that did not form and formed PTAs are almost equal, 
suggesting that intra industry trade may not be a significant factor for SS PTA formation.  
Table 4 and Appendix Table 6 show the results of the sequential probit estimations.  In 
both tables, columns (1) (3) contain results for North North country pairs, columns (4) (6) for 
North South country pairs, and columns (7) (9) for South South country pairs.  Among the 
variables of concern, Table 4, columns (1), (4), and (7) consider distance and total bilateral trade; 
columns (2), (5), and (8) consider distance and inter industry trade; and columns (3), (6), and (9) 
consider distance and intra industry trade.  All specifications are estimated with control 
variables, coefficient estimates of which are listed in Appendix Table 6.  Interpreting the probit 
coefficients requires evaluating them at certain values of the explanatory variables.  I follow the 
convention
52  and evaluate the marginal effects based on the mean values of the explanatory 
variables.   
Table 4 Panel A shows the impact of 1980 variables on the probability that a country pair 
without a PTA in 1980 will have one by 1995, while Panel B shows the impact of 1995 variables 
on the probability that a country pair without a PTA in 1995 will have one by 2006.  For any 
country pair, distance is statistically significant and decreases the probability that a PTA will be 
formed, as expected.  For PTAs formed from 1980 to 1995 (Panel A), a 10 percent increase in 
distance will decrease the probability that a North country will seek another North country by  
                                                 
52 Wooldridge (2002), Freese and Long (2006) 38 
 
Table 4.  Impact of Distance and Trade Variables on PTA Formation  
Using Sequential Probit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Distance -0.0181** -0.0149** -0.0200** -0.0043** -0.0048** -0.0050** -0.0240** -0.0213** -0.0270**
(0.189) (0.194) (0.184) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.053) (0.054) (0.052)
Total Bilateral Trade 0.0013** 0.0003** 0.0020**
(0.045) (0.015) (0.013)
Inter-industry Trade 0.0012** 0.0002** 0.0021**
(0.046) (0.016) (0.010)
Intra-industry Trade 0.0304** -0.0010 -0.0279
(0.993) (0.939) (2.051)
Overall Percent Correctly Predicted 96.83 97.13 96.23 97.46 97.43 97.46 95.59 95.74 95.69
Positive Predictive Value (P*=1) 91.30 91.45 94.87 55.56 54.55 56.25 42.50 50.00 46.88
Negative Predictive Value (P*=0) 97.99 98.35 99.08 97.89 97.83 97.83 96.12 96.19 96.08
R
2 (McKelvey and Zavoina's) 0.867 0.873 0.959 0.669 0.665 0.692 0.358 0.387 0.353
Distance -0.0248** -0.0265** -0.0248** -0.0046** -0.0050** -0.0057** -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0013**
(0.176) (0.174) (0.177) (0.071) (0.070) (0.067) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094)
Total Bilateral Trade 0.0033** 0.0012** 0.0001**
(0.037) (0.019) (0.024)
Inter-industry Trade 0.0029** 0.0012** 0.0001*
(0.034) (0.019) (0.022)
Intra-industry Trade 0.1236** 0.0312** -0.0044
(1.025) (0.612) (3.237)
Percentage Correctly Predicted 95.06 94.70 95.25 96.62 96.53 96.33 98.72 98.72 98.77
Positive Predictive Value (P*=1) 50.00 25.00 57.14 64.29 59.26 45.45 60.00 60.00 80.00
Negative Predictive Value (P*=0) 95.56 95.21 95.74 96.88 96.82 96.65 98.76 98.76 98.79
R
2 (McKelvey and Zavoina's) 0.494 0.483 0.471 0.581 0.575 0.515 0.502 0.501 0.483
Panel A: PTA formed form 1981-1995
Panel B: PTA formed form 1996-2006
NN NS SS
 
Notes:  Reported coefficeints are marginal effects.   ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5% level and 10% level, respectively.   
             Values in (  ) are standard errors.   
 
about 15 20 percent as seen in columns (1) (3) and a South country by about 5 percent as seen in 
columns (4) (6).  This suggests that North countries are more sensitive to distance when they 
choose another North country as a partner than a South country.  A possible reason for this is that 
North South country pairs, on average, are more distant from each other, as seen in Table 3.  
Meanwhile, a 10 percent increase in distance will decrease the probability that a South country 
will form a PTA with another South country by about 21 27 percent, as seen in columns (7) (9).  
This is in line with expectations that South countries should be more sensitive to distance when 39 
 
they seek another South country as a partner over a North since any gains from trade with 
another South country may be outweighed by costs associated with distance.  Thus, support is 
found for Hypothesis 1(ii).  In addition, it is apparent that the impact of distance for the period 
1980 1995 is not similar across country pairs, which is consistent with the findings in Table 2 
that the impact of distance for said period is significantly different across country pairs.  
Looking at the trade variables in Panel A, total bilateral trade and inter industry trade are 
significant for all country pairs, but intra industry trade is statistically significant only for North 
North country pairs.  A 10 percent increase in total bilateral trade will increase the probability 
that a North North, North South, and South South PTA will be formed by 1.3 percent, 0.3 
percent and 2 percent, respectively.  This suggests that country pairs that have trading 
relationship in 1980 have greater probability of forming a PTA by 1995.   
A 10 percent increase in inter industry trade, meanwhile, will increase the probability of 
PTA formation for North North country pairs by 1.2 percent, North South country pairs by 0.2 
percent, and South South country pairs by 2.1 percent.  These results are inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that inter industry trade should have more weight in North South PTA formation 
compared to North North and South South PTAs.  However, it is noteworthy that the impacts of 
both total bilateral and inter industry trades are greatest for South South country pairs.  
A 10 unit increase in the intra industry trade index increases the probability that North 
North country pairs will form a PTA by 30.4 percent.  Intra industry trade is not a significant 
predictor of North South and South South PTAs formed prior to 1995.  This is consistent with 
the findings in Table 2 that the impact of intra industry trade is not significantly different for 
North South and South South country pairs.  In addition, these results support the hypothesis that 
the impact of intra industry trade on PTA formation is largest for North North country pairs and 
should have no impact for South South country pairs.  The insignificance of intra industry for 40 
 
North South country pairs may be a manifestation that international product fragmentation is not 
prevalent over the time period considered.  Thus, mixed support is found for Hypothesis 1(i), but 
no support is found for Hypothesis 2.     
  The impact of other variables on PTA formation is displayed in Appendix Table 6.  Panel 
A, columns (1) (3) show that as the difference in market size and trade balance decrease and 
when both countries are democratic, there is a greater probability that a North North country pair 
will form a PTA.  The impacts of these variables are more economically significant than total 
bilateral and inter industry trades.  Only intra industry trade is more economically significant 
than any other control variable.   
For North South country pairs, only the difference in financial openness, political 
proximity and government type are insignificant as seen in Panel A, columns (4) (6).  In contrast 
to North North country pairs,
53 as the capital to labor ratios of North South country pairs 
become more divergent, the greater is the probability that a PTA will be formed between them.  
The impact of the difference in capital to labor ratios is more economically significant than the 
trade variables, implying that though North South country pairs that have a history of trading 
have a greater probability of forming a PTA, potential trade due to comparative advantage gains 
may be more important.  In addition, it is notable that the impact of the same language dummy is 
economically more significant than any variable.     
For South South country pairs, all control variables, except for the difference in market 
size and capital to labor ratios, have significant impact on the decision to form a PTA, as seen in 
Panel A, columns (7) to (9).  It is noticeable that among the explanatory variables, political 
proximity has the most economically significant impact in the decision to form a South South 
PTA.  In particular, South countries that have the same political preferences have a greater 
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probability of forming a PTA with each other.  Noteworthy also is that among the three country 
pairs, political proximity is only statistically significant for South South country pairs.  This 
suggests that South South PTAs are very political in nature.     
  Table 4, Panel B shows the impact of distance and 1995 trade variables on the probability 
that a country pair will have a PTA by 2006.  Distance remains to be significant for all country 
pairs.  However, the impact of distance has markedly decreased for South South country pairs.  
A 10 percent increase in distance will only decrease the probability of South South PTA 
formation by about 1 percent.  For North South country pairs, the impact of distance is similar to 
the previous period, such that a 10 percent increase in distance will decrease the probability of 
North South PTA formation by about 5 percent.  For North North country pairs, the impact of 
distance increased, such that a 10 percent increase in distance will decrease the probability of 
North North PTA formation by about 25 percent.  Results are inconsistent with expectations that 
the impact of distance should be greatest for South South country pairs.  Nevertheless, the 
findings are consistent with those in Table 2 that the impact of distance is different across 
country pairs.  Thus, there is mixed support for Hypothesis 1(ii).  
  Inspection of the trade variables in Panel B reveals that total bilateral trade remains to be 
a statistically significant factor in influencing PTAs formed after 1995 for all country pairs.  A 
10 percent increase in total bilateral trade will increase the probability that North North, North 
South, and South South country pairs will form a PTA by 3.3, 1.2, and 0.1 percent, respectively.  
Disaggregating total bilateral trade into inter  and intra industry trades reveals more insights.  A 
10 percent increase in inter industry trade will increase the probability that North North country 
pairs will form a PTA by 2.9 percent, North South country pairs by 1.2 percent and South South 
country pairs by 0.1 percent.  This is inconsistent with expectations that inter industry trade 
should be most significant for North South country pairs.  However, the findings are consistent 42 
 
with Table 2 that the impact of total bilateral trade and inter industry trade are different across 
country pairs.  Intra industry trade, meanwhile, is a very significant predictor of North North 
PTAs, such that a 10 unit increase in the intra industry trade index increases the probability of 
PTA formation by over 100 percent.  For North South country pairs, intra industry trade has 
become a significant predictor of PTA formation, such that a 10 unit increase in the intra 
industry trade index increases the probability of PTA formation by 31.2 percent.  It remains 
insignificant for South South country pairs, as expected.  It is noteworthy that the impact of 
intra industry trade is economically very significant for both North North and North South 
country pairs compared to the impact of other explanatory variables as seen in Appendix Table 6.  
In addition, for North North and North South country pairs, it is noticeable that all trade 
variables have a greater role in explaining PTA formation in the period 1995 2006 compared to 
1980 1995.  This is in contrast to South South country pairs, where the impact of all trade 
variables declined in both statistical and economic significance for the period 1995 2006.  
The aforementioned gives mixed support for Hypothesis 1(i).  In addition, the significant 
and positive impact of intra industry trade on the probability of North South PTA formation 
supports Hypothesis 2.  Since Hypothesis 2 found no support for the period prior to 1995, this 
suggests that international product fragmentation has only influenced North South PTA 
formation after 1995. 
  For the control variables, Appendix Table 6, Panel B shows that for North North country 
pairs, only the difference in market size and financial openness have statistically significant 
impact on PTA formation.  For North South country pairs, all control variables are statistically 
significant.  For South South country pairs, only the differences in market size and financial 
openness, and same language dummy have statistically significant impact on PTA formation.   43 
 
  To assess the predictive power of the model, I compared the observed and predicted 
values for each outcome.  At the bottom of each panel in Table 4, Percent Correctly Predicted 
refers to the total percentage of country pairs correctly classified by the model as having formed 
or not formed a PTA relative to the actual observations.  Positive Predictive Value refers to the 
percentage of observations correctly classified by the model as having a positive outcome 
relative to the actual observations with positive outcome (P*=1) and  egative Predictive Value 
refers to the percentage of observations correctly classified by the model as having a negative 
outcome relative to the actual observations with negative outcome (P*=0).  Also listed at the 
bottom of each panel is McKelvey and Zavoina’s R
2.  The latter explains the proportion of the 
variability in the dependent variable explained by the model and accounts for the correlation 
between the model’s predicted values and actual values (Long, 1997).
54   
  For the period 1980 1995, the model has the highest Positive Predictive Value for North 
North country pairs (91 95 percent) and least for South South country pairs (42 50 percent).  
 egative Predictive Value and Percent Correctly Predicted for all country pairs are fairly high 
and ranges from 96 99 percent.  McKelvey and Zavoina’s R
2, meanwhile, suggests that the 
model explains about 86 96 percent, 67 69 percent, and 36 39 percent of the variability in the 
decision to form North North, North South, and South South PTAs, respectively.   For the 
period 1996 2006, the model has the highest Positive Predictive Value for South South country 
pairs (60 80 percent) and least for North North country pairs (25 57 percent).  The model 
explains about 47 50 percent, 51 58 percent, and 48 50 percent of the variability in the decision 
to form North North, North South, and South South PTAs, respectively, as suggested by 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R
2.   
                                                 
54 Its calculations are based on predicting a continuous latent variable underlying the observed 0 1 outcome in the 
data.  According to Hagle and Mitchell (1992) and Windmeijer (1995), McKelvey and Zavoina’s R
2 closely 
approximates the R
2 obtained by fitting the linear regression model on the underlying latent variable (Freese and 
Long, 2006).   44 
 
C.  Robustness Check 
  To check the robustness of results I estimate equation (18) using multinomial probit, 
where three possible outcomes for a country pair are possible, given by 
 
         0,   if a PTA is not formed by a country pair in any period 
 PTA    =       1,  if a PTA was formed by a country pair between 1980 and 1995 
         2,   if a PTA was formed by a country pair between 1996 and 2006 
   
The obvious choice as the base outcome is 0.  In the multinomial probit estimation, 1980 
characteristics are used to explain PTA formation for both periods.  In contrast to sequential 
probit estimation, where each binary probit estimation is based on a different sample, in 
multinomial probit, each outcome is based on the same sample.  However, multinomial probit 
has computational difficulties, and is therefore rarely used in practice.  An alternative is to use 
multinomial logit, which is faster to implement.  According to Freese and Long (2006), since 
multinomial logit and multinomial probit produce nearly identical predictions, then the former 
should be used instead of the latter.
55  
Results of multinomial logit estimations are presented in Table 5.  Panels A, B, and C 
show results for North North, North South, and South South country pairs, respectively.  In each 
column, Outcomes 1and 2 display the impact of 1980 variables on the probability that a country 
pair will have a PTA by 1995 and 2006, respectively.  Column (1) presents the coefficient 
estimates for distance and total bilateral trade; column (2) for distance and inter industry trade; 
and column (3) for distance and intra industry trade.   
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Table 5. Impact of Distance and Trade Variables on PTA Formation 
Using Multinomial Logit 
 
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 1 Outcome 2
Distance -0.0099** -0.0001** -0.0088** -0.0001** -0.0182** -0.0001**
(0.537) (0.340) (0.542) (0.344) (0.482) (0.343)
Total Bilateral Trade 0.0010** 0.0001**
(0.109) (0.066)
Inter-industry Trade 0.0008** 0.0001*
(0.108) (0.069)




Distance -0.0981** -0.0045** -0.1026** -0.0048** -0.1362** -0.0097**
(0.248) (0.204) (0.248) (0.203) (0.255) (0.198)
Total Bilateral Trade 0.0077** 0.0014**
(0.041) (0.042)
Inter-industry Trade 0.0070** 0.0016**
(0.041) (0.046)




Distance -0.1397** -0.0002** -0.1303** -0.0003** -0.1823** -0.0003**
(0.107) (0.212) (0.108) (0.208) (0.105) (0.211)
Total Bilateral Trade 0.0124** 0.0001**
(0.026) (0.046)
Inter-industry Trade 0.0129** 0.0001
(0.021) (0.036)




Panel B.  North-South
0.955 0.954 0.950
Panel C.  South-South
0.944 0.944 0.944
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A.  North-North
0.940 0.941 0.938
                   Notes:  Outcome 1 refers to PTA formation in 1980-1995, while Outcome 2 refers to PTA formation in 1996-2006.   
     Reported coefficeints are marginal effects.  All estimations are done with the same control varibles as  
     listed in Appendix Table 6, but coefficient estimates are not reported for brevity purposes.   
     ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5% level and 10% level, repsectively.  
     Values in (  ) are standard errors.   
 
Though the magnitudes of the variables computed under sequential probit and 
multinomial logit are not directly comparable, the statistical and economic significance of the 
trade variables derived using multinomial logit give similar implications as those derived using 
sequential probit estimations.  For PTAs formed from 1980 1995 (Outcome 1), distance has the 
greatest impact for South South country pairs and least for North North country pairs.   46 
 
For the trade variables, the implications of the magnitude and significance of the variables are 
similar to those in Table 4.   
 
For PTAs formed from 1996 2006 (Outcome 2), distance remains to be significant, such 
that an increase in distance will decrease the probability of PTA formation between any country 
pair.  For the trade variables, while their statistical significance is similar to those in Table 4, 
their economic impact is almost nil.  Noticeable also is the insignificance of intra industry trade 
for North South country pairs.  These imply that 1980 trade variables provide weak explanatory 
power for PTAs formed in the period 1996 2006.  This may suggest that 1980 trade relationship 
is too distant to be considered as an important factor in the decision to form a PTA in 1996 2006 
and that more recent trading relationship may be more important.   
For multinomial logit estimation, McKelvey and Zavoina’s R
2 is not calculated.  Thus, to 
assess the predictive power of the multinomial logit model, I use the Adjusted Count R
2, which 
calculates the proportion of correct predictions.  Based on this measure, the multinomial logit 
estimation gives about 95 percent correct predictions for all country pairs.   
Next, instead of just letting distance be equal to the mean when evaluating the marginal 
effects, I assumed that the distance between country pairs increases from the sample minimum to 
2,000 miles and I obtained the change in the probability of PTA formation from such an increase.  
Results are shown in Table 6.  Such an increase dramatically decreases the probability of PTA 
formation for all country pairs for the period 1980 1995.  This is consistent with the actual data 
that countries that form PTAs have distances less than the sample mean.
56  When the trade 
variables are set equal to their means and all countries are assumed to be 2,000 miles apart from 
each other, the trade variables have minimal impact on PTA formation, as seen in rows that 
display marginal effect.  Again, this is consistent with actual data – country pairs with only 
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average trade do not form PTAs, especially so if they are distant from each other.  Increasing the 
values of the trade variables from the minimum to maximum raises the probability of PTA 
formation for North North and South South country pairs, as seen in the rows that display 
minimum to maximum value.  This implies that greater trading relationship can partially offset 
the negative impact of the increase in distance on the probability of PTA formation.   
 
Table 6.  Impact of Distance and Trade Variables on PTA Formation  
with Increased Distance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Distance
a -0.993** -0.994** -0.763** -0.933** -0.941** -0.975** -0.687** -0.682** -0.761**
Total Bilateral Trade
b
   marginal effect 0.002** 0.001** 0.003**
   minimum to maximum value 0.070** 0.002** 0.079**
Inter-industry Trade
b
   marginal effect 0.002** 0.001** 0.003**
   minimum to maximum value 0.072** 0.001* 0.099**
Intra-industry Trade
b
   marginal effect 0.000** -0.002* -0.036
   minimum to maximum value 0.001** -0.001* -0.014
Distance
a -0.574** -0.564** -0.522** -0.291** -0.294** -0.344** -0.231** -0.245** -0.272**
Total Bilateral Trade
b
   marginal effect 0.007** 0.002** 0.000**
   minimum to maximum value 0.157** 0.151** 0.001**
Inter-industry Trade
b
   marginal effect 0.005** 0.002** 0.000*
   minimum to maximum value 0.106** 0.115** 0.001**
Intra-industry Trade
b
   marginal effect 0.229** 0.045** -0.006
   minimum to maximum value 0.496** 0.168** -0.001
NN NS SS
Panel A: PTA formed form 1981-1995
Panel B: PTA formed form 1996-2006
 
                    Notes:  a - Distance is assumed to increase from the sub-sample minimum to 2,000 miles.  Other variables are set equal to  
                   their means. 
              b - Reported coefficeints are either the marginal effects or the change in probability when the variable changes from its  
                     minimum to maximum value.  Distance is set equal to 2,000 miles. 
                All estimations are done with the same control varibles as listed in Appendix Table 6, but coefficient estimates are not  
              reported for brevity purposes.   
              ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5% level and 10% level, respectively.  
 
For the period 1996 2006, increasing distance from the sample minimum to 2,000 miles 
decreases PTA formation, but the impact is not as dramatic as that in the earlier period.  
Increasing the values of the trade variables from the minimum to the maximum increases the 48 
 
probability of PTA formation for both North North and North South country pairs.  Again, this 
suggests that greater trading relationship can partially offset the negative impact of the increase 
in distance on PTA formation.  However, this is not the case for South South country pairs, 
implying that factors other than the trading relationship are more important when South countries 
decide to form a PTA with each other.
57  This confirms earlier findings that South South country 
pairs may be highly political in nature.
58  
 
VI.  Conclusion 
  This study found that additional insights on PTA formation could be gained from 
separating North South, North North, and South South country pairs.  First, countries choose 
PTA partners that are geographically proximate to them, which support the natural trading 
partner hypothesis.  Though geographical proximity is significant for PTA formation for all 
country pairs, its impact is different across country pairs and periods.  Second, most countries 
choose PTA partners with which they have a history of trading, which supports the natural 
trading partners hypothesis.  This suggests that PTAs are formed by countries in order to 
                                                 
57 This holds even when distance is set equal to 1,000 miles and trade variables are increased from the minimum to 
the maximum value.   
58 Additional regressions were also done including dummy variables to countries that are members of well known 
trading blocs – EC, COMESA, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and ASEAN, since it is possible that countries seek them as 
PTA partners because they are members of these trading blocs.  However, they are insignificant and there were no 
significant changes in the results.  An obvious reason would be that these are regional PTAs; hence, including them 
is akin to adding regional dummy variables, which I have already done in all the specifications.  Additional 
robustness check was done by using World Bank’s classification of developed (high income) and developing 
(medium and low income) countries based on gross national income per capita instead of HDI as the classification 
of North and South countries.  Doing so resulted in reclassification of five North countries to South, namely, 
Argentina, Hungary, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, and Uruguay.  No major changes were seen; thus, results are 
not reported.  An attempt was made to consider only bilateral PTAs in the estimation.  However, I did not proceed 
with such estimation due to the very small number of country pairs with PTA*=1 if only bilateral PTAs are 
considered.  In addition, most countries that have bilateral trade agreements belong to the Post Soviet States, which 
are not included in my sample of countries.  Finally, a dummy variable equal to 1 was included in regressions if at 
least one of the countries in a country pair had a financial crisis in the periods 1981 1995 and 1996 2006; and equal 
to 0, otherwise. The dummy variable was insignificant for all country pairs for the period 1981 1995.  It is 
significant for both North South and South South country pairs for the period 1996 2006.  However, results are not 
reported since adding the dummy does not alter the implications of the reported findings.   49 
 
strengthen the already existing trading relationship and not necessarily to dramatically increase 
the volume of trade.  If this is the case, the fear of trade diversion brought by the influx of PTAs 
may have been over emphasized.  However, to make a definite claim on this requires empirical 
verification, which I leave for future research.  Third, the importance of inter  and intra industry 
trades differs across country pairs.  While inter industry trade is mostly significant for all country 
pairs, intra industry has a positive impact only for North South and North North country pairs.   
  In addition, in contrast to previous studies that have analyzed trade policy from the point 
of view of import competing firms, using a simple model, this study has demonstrated that trade 
protection is not the necessary outcome when trade policy formulation considers exporters and 
domestic firms that use imported inputs.  In particular, this study has shown that international 
product fragmentation can positively influence the formation of North South PTAs.  I claim that 
the significance of intra industry trade for North South country pairs is due to international 
product fragmentation.  This supports the proposition put forth that the developments in 
international division of labor have contributed to the formation of North South PTAs.  
Moreover, this suggests that North South PTAs are formed to secure existing trading 
relationship.  In particular, forming a PTA with a North country may be a way by which a South 
country tries to gain greater competitiveness in the former’s market over other South countries.   
Results suggest that WTO rules should recognize the increasing importance of 
internationalization of production.  This is important as internationalization of production has 
contributed to the increased trade disputes over the past years.  As Baldwin (2001) points out, 
much of the petitions on unfair trade practices received by the WTO concern trade in 
intermediate inputs, but the procedures set forth in the WTO for dealing with these petitions are 
based on a trading world where all inputs to production of a final good are produced 
domestically.  Moreover, internationalization of production has made rules of origin (ROO) more 50 
 
controversial.  Harilal and Beena (2003) pointed out that the proliferation of PTAs has been 
accompanied by proliferation of ROO.  ROO under PTAs are exempt from WTO’s agreement on 
ROO.  Since a country can join an unlimited number of PTAs, this implies that a country can 
likewise have numerous ROO, as it can have a unique one for each PTA.  Whether countries can 
effectively monitor compliance for each PTA and whether ROO are consistent with each can 
cause many potential problems.  Finally, the proliferation of PTAs even among geographically 
distant countries suggest that countries find it easier to negotiate among themselves than to rely 
































Appendix:  Description of Some Control Variables 
 
1.  Inter industry Trade 
 
This variable is computed as: 
r hf r r hf Ex , , Im − ∑  
where  r hf Ex , is the total value of exports in industry r from country h to f; and  r hf , Im is the 
total value of imports in industry r of country h from f.  Industry r is defined by the four digit 
SITC level of commodity classification.   
   
2.  Grubel Lloyd Intra industry Trade Index 
 
This variable is computed as: 
1    ( ) { } r hf r hf r hf r r hf Ex Ex , , , , Im / Im − − ∑  
where  r hf Ex , is the total value of exports in industry r from country h to f; and  r hf , Im is the 
total value of imports in industry r of country h from f.  Industry r is defined by the four digit 
SITC level of commodity classification.   
 
This simple index measures both horizontal and vertical IIT.  Horizontal IIT arises from 
horizontal product differentiation, where products are different because of certain attributes, 
but are fundamentally the same in terms of quality, cost, and technology employed in their 
production.  Monopolistic competition models with the existence of economies of scale in a 
differentiated product explain horizontal IIT.
59  Such type of trade explains intra industry 
trade among developed North countries.    
 
Vertical IIT, meanwhile, may arise due to either vertical product differentiation or 
international product fragmentation.  The former is the traditional explanation of vertical IIT, 
where a product is differentiated in terms of quality.   Either the Heckscher Ohlin or the 
Ricardian model of trade can be used to explain vertical IIT.
60  High (low) quality varieties 
are assumed to be produced by a country with high (low) capital to labor ratio or with a 
technology that requires higher (lower) capital to labor ratio.  The modern explanation of 
vertical IIT, meanwhile, stems from international product fragmentation.   In this case, 
vertical IIT arises from the splitting of two or more production blocks and locating them 
across national borders.
61   Regardless of the reason for vertical IIT, it is clear that it occurs 
between North and South countries.   
 
In the empirical literature, most studies employ unit price differentials or variants of it to 
separate horizontal from vertical IIT.
62  I do not proceed in this route, but instead I simply 
identify horizontal from vertical IIT by separating the country pairs.  As the literature 
suggests, IIT between North countries is of the horizontal type and IIT between North and 
South countries is of the vertical type.  A limitation, however, is that I am not able to 
                                                 
59 See for instance Lancaster (1980), Helpman (1981), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and Krugman (1979, 1980, 1981) 
60 See for instance Falvey (1981), Flam and Helpman (1987), and Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) 
61 See for instance Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) and Jones et al. (2002) 
62 See for instance Abd el Rahman (1991) and Greenaway, Hine, and Milner (1994, 1995) 52 
 
distinguish whether vertical IIT is due to differentiation in product quality or international 
product fragmentation.  Given the abundance of attention and empirical work in vertical IIT 
due to international product fragmentation, I believe there is enough evidence that vertical 
IIT due to international product fragmentation has grown more in importance compared to 
vertical IIT due to differences in product quality.   
 
3.  Difference in Financial Openness 
 
I use the financial openness index constructed by Chinn and Ito (2007).  This index 
(KAOPEN) varies from 0 to 1.  Values closer to 1 imply non existent capital account restrictions 
and values closer to 0 imply very restrictive capital account restrictions.   It is based on binary 
dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross border financial transactions 
reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER). This index reflects the four major categories on regulatory restrictions on external 
accounts, namely: 
 
(i)   k1: variable indicating the presence of multiple exchange rates; 
(ii)  k2: variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions; 
(iii) k3: variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions; and 
(iv)   k4: variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. 
 
For each country pair, the difference in financial openness was obtained.  Thus, values closer 
to zero imply that a country pair has similar degree of financial openness; and values closer to 
one imply that a country pair has divergent degree of financial openness.  The limitation of this 
variable, however, is that the values of the index may be close or even the same for two 
countries, but may not necessarily imply that they have the same restrictions for the same 
component of the index.   
 
4.  Political Proximity 
 
I use the political proximity variable devised by Barro and Lee (2005).  This variable varies 
from 0 to 1.  It reflects the fraction of votes that each country casts in the United Nations General 
Assembly along with the United States.  Values closer to zero imply that a country’s votes in the 
U.N General Assembly are divergent with the votes cast by U.S.  Values closer to one imply 
otherwise.   
 
For each country pair, the difference in their political proximity with respect to the United 
States was obtained.  Though this variable does not exactly measure the political proximity of a 
country pair, it may capture the similarity of their policies.  Values closer to zero imply that a 
country pair has voted similarly; and values closer to one imply that a country pair has divergent 
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Appendix Table 1.  Summary of Regional and Non Regional Country Pairs and PTAs 
0 1 Total 0 1 Total 0 1 Total
Frequency
P(PTA*=0) 3546 222 3768 598 62 660 3149 913 4062
P(PTA*=1) 5 103 108 25 93 118 9 171 180
Total 3569 331 3900 623 155 778 3158 1084 4242
Percentage
P(PTA*=1) 0.14% 31.12% 3% 4.01% 60.00% 15% 0.28% 15.77% 4%
0 1 Total 0 1 Total 0 1 Total
Frequency
P(PTA*=0) 3424 218 3642 574 49 623 3143 867 4010
P(PTA*=1) 122 4 126 24 3 27 6 46 52
Total 3546 224 3770 598 52 650 3149 913 4062
Percentage
P(PTA*=1) 3.44% 1.79% 3% 4.01% 5.77% 4% 0.19% 5.04% 1%
Same Region Same Region Same Region
2006
P(PTA*) Same Region Same Region Same Region




Source:  www.wto.org 
Notes:    Classification of countries into North and South is based on their average Human Development Index from 1980-2005.  PTA*= 1 if a  
               PTA exists between two countries and PTA*= 0 otherwise.   
               Same region = 1 if two countries are in the same region and same region = 0 otherwise.  Top panel shows the number of country pairs 
               that are not in a PTA in 1980, but have one in 1995.  Bottom panel shows the country pairs that are not in a PTA in 1995, but have one  





Appendix Table 2.  Indicators of International Production  
 
Item
1982 1990 2005 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
Gross Product of Foreign Affiliates 646 1481 4517 17.4 6.9 8.8
Sales of Foreign Affiliates 2620 6045 22171 19.7 8.9 10.1
FDI outward stock 600 1791 10672 18.0 10.7 18.9
FDI inward stock 647 1789 10130 16.8 9.3 17.3
GDP 10899 21898 44674 11.1 5.9 1.3
Exports of goods and non- 2247 4261 12641 12.7 8.7 3.6
   factor services





Source:  World Investment Report 2006 (UNCTAD) 59 
 
Appendix Table 3.  Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
PTA* =1 if country pair has a PTA in year t; 0 otherwise www.wto.org
Log of distance ln(distance between countries in 1000 km) CIA World Factbook
Log of total bilateral trade ln(Exhf+Imhf); where Exhf = total exports of country h to f and  Computed from
Imhf = total imports of country h from f  World Trade Analyzer
Inter-industry trade or  ln (Σr |Exhf,r - Imhf,r|); where Exhf,r = total value of exports in industry r  Computed from
     Net Trade from country h to f  and Imhf,r = total value of imports in industry r World Trade Analyzer
of country h from f at the four-digit SITC level of commodity
classification
Intra-indsutry trade 1-[Σr |Exhf,r - Imhf,r|/Σr (Exhf,r - Imhf,r)]; where Exhf,r = total value of exports  Computed from
in industry r from country h to f  and Imhf,r = total value of imports in  World Trade Analyzer
industry r of country h from f at the four-digit SITC level of 
commodity classification
Difference in  absolute value of the difference in real GDP of country h and f www.imf.org
     Economic Size
Difference in  absolute value of the difference in capital-labor ratio of country h and f Dutt and Mitra (2002)
     Capital to Labor Ratio
Difference in  absolute value of the difference in the Chinn & Ito financial openness Chinn & Ito (2006)
     Financial Openness index
Trade balance Σ|Exhf - Imhf|/Σ(Exhf - Imhf); where Exhf = total exports of country h to f  Computed from
and Imhf = total imports of country h from f  World Trade Analyzer
Political Proximity absolute value of the difference in the Barro and Lee political proximity Barro and Lee (2005)
index
Same language =1 if the two countries have the same official langauge www.haveman.org
Both democracies =1 if the two countries are democracies CIA World Fact Book
Same Region =1 if country pair belong to the same region; 0, otherwise www.unctad.org
Variable  Defintion  Source
 


















Appendix Table 4. Classification of Countries 
 
North Countries




Bahamas Belize Burkina Faso
Barbados Bhutan Burundi
Belgium Bolivia Cameroon
Brunei Darussalam Brazil Central African Republic
Canada Bulgaria Chad
Cyprus Cambodia Congo, Dem. Rep. of the




Greece Costa Rica Guinea
Hong Kong Dominican Republic Guinea-Bissau
Hungary Ecuador Haiti
Iceland Egypt Lao People's Dem.  Rep.









New Zealand Jamaica Papua New Guinea
Norway Jordan Rwanda
Poland Kenya Senegal
Portugal Lebanon Sierra Leone
Qatar Malaysia Sudan













































Distance (in log) 1.96 0.62 -2.18 2.99 1.83 0.81 -1.13 2.99 1.86 0.77 -1.93 2.99
Total Bilateral Trade (in log) 6.34 4.58 0 16.90 9.56 4.35 0 18.03 2.63 3.80 0 15.31
Inter-industry Trade (in log) 6.60 4.52 0 16.50 9.69 4.17 0 17.99 2.74 3.95 0 15.64
Intra-industry Trade Index 0.01 0.04 0 0.86 0.05 0.09 0 0.62 0.01 0.02 0 0.60
Difference in GDP 2.89 1.97 0 11.17 2.59 2.09 0 10.97 2.02 1.53 0 8.94
Difference in K/L 2.29 1.43 0 6.19 0.85 0.60 0 2.91 1.58 1.14 0 5.77
(Difference in K/L)
2 7.29 7.71 0 38.28 1.09 1.32 0 8.48 3.80 4.74 0 33.34
Difference in Financial Openness 1.82 1.36 0 4.37 1.69 1.24 0 3.91 1.72 1.20 0 4.37
Trade Balance 0.49 0.41 0 1 0.47 0.36 0 1 0.32 0.45 0 1
Political Proximity 0.18 0.17 0 0.86 0.22 0.18 0 0.81 0.09 0.08 0 0.50
Same Language 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.13 0.33 0 1
Both Democratic 0.77 0.42 0 1 0.75 0.44 0 1 0.78 0.42 0 1











Distance (in log) 1.99 0.58 -1.89 2.99 2.08 0.55 -0.84 2.99 1.92 0.73 -1.69 2.99
Total Bilateral Trade (in log) 7.07 4.63 0 18.05 9.97 4.41 0 18.76 3.32 4.09 0 15.07
Inter-industry Trade (in log) 7.50 4.58 0 17.80 10.70 4.19 0 18.71 3.81 4.37 0 16.22
Intra-industry Trade Index 0.03 0.06 0 0.75 0.07 0.10 0 0.60 0.02 0.03 0 0.75
Difference in GDP 3.31 2.09 0.01 10.28 2.83 2.12 0 10.38 2.07 1.56 0 7.93
Difference in K/L 2.00 0.73 0.01 3.43 0.66 0.46 0 2.23 0.54 0.45 0 2.01
(Difference in K/L)
2 4.54 2.76 0 11.76 0.64 0.77 0 4.98 0.48 0.73 0 4.06
Difference in Financial Openness 2.02 1.26 0 4.13 1.48 1.22 0 3.74 1.18 1.04 0 4.24
Trade Balance 0.49 0.39 0 1 0.52 0.36 0 1 0.37 0.44 0 1
Political Proximity 0.15 0.17 0 0.92 0.19 1.22 0 3.74 0.03 0.05 0 0.34
Same Language 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.12 0.32 0 1
Both Democratic 0.78 0.42 0 1 0.71 0.45 0 1 0.78 0.41 0 1





































Appendix Table 6.  Impact of Other Variables on PTA Formation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Difference in Market Size -0.0025** -0.0018** -0.0035** -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0004** -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0006
(0.105) (0.105) (0.101) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Difference in K/L Ratio 0.0068 0.0065 0.0073 0.0023** 0.0024** 0.0028** 0.0037 0.0031 0.0026
(1.074) (1.109) (1.027) (0.239) (0.238) (0.239) (0.142) (0.143) (0.141)
(Difference in K/L Ratio)
2 -0.0072 -0.0069 -0.0104 -0.0008** -0.0009** -0.0010** -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0020
(0.789) (0.828) (0.751) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Difference in Financial Openness -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0021* -0.0017* -0.0015
(0.106) (0.108) (0.103) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Trade Balance -0.0118** -0.0084** -0.0167** -0.0033** -0.0028** -0.0023** -0.0166** -0.0100** -0.0048
(0.450) (0.452) (0.436) (0.194) (0.185) (0.178) (0.131) (0.108) (0.108)
Political Proximity -0.0033 -0.0032 -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0632** -0.0546** -0.0644**
(0.733) (0.744) (0.725) (0.413) (0.404) (0.395) (0.636) (0.639) (0.630)
Both Democratic
a 0.0072** 0.0067** 0.0126** 0.0006 0.0008 0.0009 -0.0233** -0.0235** -0.0224**
(0.755) (0.725) (0.701) (0.196) (0.194) (0.194) (0.098) (0.100) (0.097)
Same Language
a 0.0012 0.0017 0.0041 0.0215** 0.0224** 0.0239** 0.0112** 0.0110** 0.0147**
(0.547) (0.545) (0.502) (0.152) (0.151) (0.149) (0.101) (0.102) (0.099)
Difference in Market Size -0.0057** -0.0060** -0.0063** -0.0017** -0.0018** -0.0040** -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002
(0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076)
Difference in K/L Ratio 0.0190 0.0248 0.0332 0.0052* 0.0076** 0.0120** -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002
(1.064) (1.067) (1.091) (0.346) (0.336) (0.322) (0.732) (0.711) (0.708)
(Difference in K/L Ratio)
2 -0.0236 -0.0289 -0.0299 -0.0026** -0.0034** -0.0057** -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0006
(0.778) (0.787) (0.806) (0.100) (0.027) (0.093) (0.572) (0.556) (0.559)
Difference in Financial Openness 0.0071** 0.0070** 0.0057** 0.0018** 0.0020** 0.0054** -0.0005** -0.0006** -0.0006**
(0.099) (0.095) (0.098) (0.053) (0.053) (0.048) (0.132) (0.132) (0.126)
Trade Balance -0.0136 -0.0194* -0.0027 -0.0039** -0.0036** -0.0036* -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0002
(0.385) (0.360) (0.401) (0.177) (0.171) (0.149) (0.257) (0.235) (0.211)
Political Proximity -0.0279 -0.0246 -0.0303 0.0085** 0.0114** 0.0341** 0.0018 0.0020 0.0038
(0.789) (0.784) (0.804) (0.354) (0.342) (0.318) (2.047) (2.037) (1.968)
Both Democratic
a *** *** *** 0.0071** 0.0080** 0.0144** *** *** ***
(0.356) (0.345) (0.349)
Same Language
a *** *** *** -0.0028** -0.0030** -0.0054** 0.0042** 0.0045** 0.0057**
(0.268) (0.262) (0.243) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165)
Panel A: PTA formed form 1981-1995
Panel B: PTA formed form 1996-2006
NN NS SS
 
Notes:  Reported coefficients are marginal effects.  
             a  - Reported coefficeints are the impact when there is a discrete change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
             ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5% level and 10% level, repsectively. Values in (  ) are standard errors.   
             *** indicates perfect failure if Same Language = 0 and Both Democratic = 1. 